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APPENDIX l1.-STATEMENT OF JOHN WARREN KINDT,l PROFESSOR, 
UNNERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN 2 
On September 21r 1994 r the House Committee on Small Business held 
a hearing on_the socio-economic impacts of the trend toward increased 
legalized gambling activities. 3 At th:e hearing r the committee received 
- testimo~y from various expertsr all of whom criticized the impacts 
legalized gambling activities inflict upon social-welfa~e budgets r the 
criminal justice system r small businesses, and the u.S. economic base. 
Among other conclusions presented, legalized gambling--as a strategy for 
economic development--.was thoroughly discredited. Indeed r Committee 
Chair John J. LaFalce expressed his own concerns on the issue, including 
the need for a national policy. 
Despite these expressed concerns, legalized gambling interests are 
utilizing millions of dollars to misdirect the debate and cause 
government decisionmaker.s and the public to 'reach invalid conclusions. 
First, there is the incorrect assumption that legalized gambling 
activities are like other business activities. Instead, legalized 
gambling activities have large industry-specific negatives, reSUlting in 
1 Professor, Univ. Ill. at Urbana-Champaign. B.A. 1972, William & 
Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977, U. Ga.; LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, U. Va.; 
Associate, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International 
Security, University of Illinois. This Statement should be interpreted 
as representing only the individual views of the author. 
2Some new developments and footnotes have been added, but most of 
this abbreviated Statement was originally published as part of the 
following article: John W. Kindt, U.S. National Security And The 
Strategic Economic Base: The BusinesS/Economic Impacts Of The 
Legalization Of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LOUISU.L.J. 567 (1995) 
[hereinafter strategic Economic Base]. To save space, substantial 
footnotes and text from the published Article have been omitted from 
this abbreviated Statement, but the e~tire text and supporting 
documentation may be found in the St. Louis University Law Journal. 
3 See generally The National Impact of Casino Gambling 
Proliferation: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-32 (1994) [hereinafter Congo Hearing]. 
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a cumulative negative economic impact. 4 Second, the industry's 
tendency to focus attention on specialized factors provides a distorted 
view of the localized economic positives, while ignoring the large 
business-economic costs to different regions of the United States. s 
Third, the extraordinary amount of money which is legally used to 
overwhelm any opposition leads to unbalanced decisio~aking processes by 
elected officials, regulatory agencies, and even the court system. 
Almost by definition, there can be little compromise; that is, either 
the national economy is a non-gambling one, or it is a legalized 
gambling economy which will eventually "bust." 
Therefore, with the legalization of various types of gambling 
activities sweeping the United States and much of the international 
community, the issue is whether this trend constitutes an economic boom, 
a harmless recreational pastime, or an act~al threat to the strategic 
economic base of the industrialized world, and in particular, of the 
United States. Business-economic history indicates that the widespread 
legalization of gambling activities precipitates a classic "boom and 
bust" economic cycle. Accordingly, there is substantial economic 
evidence and public policy precedent to conclude that because legalizing 
gambling activities represents a threat to the U.S. economic base and to 
stability of expectations,b Congress should consider federal 
legislation to re-criminalize or severely limit legalized gambling 
4See generally, ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Ctr. Econ. Development, U. Mass.-Amherst 1994) 
[hereinafter CEDREpORT] • 
SSee, ~, CAL. GOVERNoR's OFF. PLAN. & RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA: 
SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ES -1 (Dec. 
1992) . 
bIn the areas of legal and government policy, which subsume 
strategic socio-econ~ic and business concerns; the classic decision-
making·models were formulated by the post legal realists, in particular, 
Professor Myres McDougal arid Professor Harold Lasswell who postulated a 
conceptual framework for legal decision-making in a landmark article 
directed toward legal educators and law professors. Harold D. Lasswell 
& Myres S. McDougal,Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943). See also 
Harold D. Lasswell &.Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law, 
44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 362 (1971)~.Myres S. MCDougal, JurisDrudence for a 
Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1 (1966) i John W. Kindt, An Analysis Of 
Legal Education And Business Education Within The Context Of A J.D./MBA 
Program, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 512, 517-18 (1982). The decision-making 
concepts which McDougal and Lasswell introduced were later expanded to 
include international law and U.S. domestic law, as these areas 
interfaced with "policy-oriented jurisprudence." See John N. Moore, 
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 
54 VA. L. REV. 662 (1968) i The Lasswell-McDougal Enterorise: Toward a 
" World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 535 (1974). 
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activity. These conclusions are supported by both cursory and in-depth 
.reviews via the classic McDougal/Lasswell decision-making model for 
policymakers.7 
This strategic economic threat to the United States is immediate 
and should be addressed quickly before newly developing constituencies 
in the legalized gambling industry become widespread enough to dictate 
economic policy.s F~r example, the legalized gambling industry drafted 
a state constitutional referendum in Florida which aimed to "mandate" 
the introduction of casino-style gambling activities--even into 
communities which voted unanimously against such activities. 9 It is 
therefore not surprising that testimony presented at the 1994 
congressional hearing indicated that in the future, ,franchised legalized 
gambling parlors may be as widespread as fast-food hamburger chains are 
today. 10 
Thus, the gravamen of the 1994 hearing was that u.S. policymakers 
need to develop a national policy on increased legalized gambling 
activities. Testimony at th~ 1994 congressional hearing estimated that 
if the current trend toward more legalized gambling activities 
continues, the net economic effect could result in the equivalent of an 
additional recession everY 8 to 15 years. 11 Combined with regular 
cyclical recessions, the u.s. economy faces'double jeopardy. 
Furthermore, although legalized gambling has just begun to expand in 
earnest, its sales already equal approximately two and one-half percent 
of U.S. Gross Domestic Product. 12 
In any event, macro-economic theories and concomitant economic 
formulae do not address this growing phenomenon. With the policy 
changes in the former Soviet union and elsewhere, the stability and 
strength of the U.s. economic base will change rapidly in the next few 
years. The U.s. Bureau of Economic Analysis (and its economic 
"multipliers" which could easily be negligible or even negative with 
" 
aFor an authoritative analysis supporting this recommendation, see 
CED REpORT, supra note 4, at 18.' Many policymakers are concerned that 
legalized gambling interests have large budgets to support efforts ~o 
legalize various forms of gambling throughout the Unfted States. For 
example, New Jersey has restrictions prohibiting political contributions 
from casinos .. Id. 
9See Martin Dyckman, Misleading the Public, . ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 1994, at A13. 
10See Congo Hearing, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
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respect to legalized gambling activities) ,13 as well as other economic 
agencies will need to keep pace. Furthermore, u.s. policymakers should 
query whether an economy which is becoming so heavily influenced and 
dependent on legalized gambling activities--which do not create new 
money or goods - - is similar to the vulnerable, oil-dependent', U. S . 
economy of the early 1970s. 
'In the laOOs, the strategic economic and mili,tary consequences of 
an economic downturn were less destructive and less absolute. However, 
in the modern world, the United States and its allies cannot afford to 
experiment with their interdependent economies by elevating legalized 
gambling activities to the level where an economic "boom and bust" 
cycle14 or a classic " speculative economic bubble ,,15 could occur. 16 
Unfortunately, because of the gambling industry and the vagaries of the 
U.s. legal system17 which protects the scope and speed with which the 
political constituencies supporting the legalized gambling industry 
develop,lS such experiments may already be so far advanced that they 
are beyond the control of U.s. policymakers. 
4 
Due to several large socio-economic negatives which are associated 
with legalized gambling activities but which neither occur in nor 
accompany other types of industries, it can be concluded that there are 
substantial business and economic reasons to believe that widespread 
(and even localized) legalized gambling activities are inherently 
recessionary in nature. These negatives include: modest increases in 
infrastructure costs, relatively high increases in regulatory costs, 
large costs to the, criminal justice system, and social-welfare and 
l3As of 1994, for example, the u.s. Bureau of Economic Analysis had 
no economic multiPliers, for the legalized gambling/riverboat industry. 
The CED Report indicated that the mUltipliers for legalized gambling 
activities are negative. CED REpORT, supra note 4, at 49-50j ~ Congo 
Hearing, supra note 3,at 81. 
HCED REpORT, supra note 4, at 18. 
l5For example, the 1929 U.S. stock market scenario presents such a 
bubble.' See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 204 (14th 
ed'. 1992) '("Speculative Bubbl~s"} j PAUL A. SAMtJELSON, ECONOMICS 424-25 
(lOth ed. 1976). See also Congo Hearing, supra note 3, at 71-73. 
l6See Steven D. Gold,It's Not a Miracle, It's a Mirage,.! ST. LEGIS., 
Feb. 1994, at 28. 
l7See generally I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAw (1986). 
laCED REpORT, supra note 4, at lB. 
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business-economic costs in the billions of dollars.~9 These business 
and economic costs can easily translate into recessionary pressures and 
lost jobs from the rest of the economy. Furthermore, the net creation 
of jobs claimed by the legalized gambling industry is at best a 
breakeven proposition, and the evidence suggests that regional net job 
losses can easily occuro--primarily because "consumer dollars" are 
drained from.the economy.2~ ·The literature frequently refers to this 
process as "cannibalization" of the pre-existing economy--including the 
pre-existing "tourist" economy.22 
5 
As of 1993, no state had a plan concerning the statewide 
development of various legalized gambling activities. The only baseline 
study was a 1976 federal report by the u.s. Commission on the Review of 
the National Policy Toward Gambling, entitled Gambling in America. 23 
This 1976 report was apparently prompted~y the proposed economic 
development of Atlantic City, New Jersey, via the legalization of land-
based casino gambling. Considering that in general the Atlantic City 
economy has significantly worsened since 1976, serious questions should 
be raised about extending this experiment nationwide. 
B See , ~, MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE 
ADMIN., TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND (1990) (Valerie C. Lorenz 
& Robert M. Politzer, co-chairs 1990). For example, "[plathological 
gamblers cost Maryland and its citizens about $1.5 billion annually in 
lost work productivity and embezzled, stolen or otherwise abused 
dollars." Id. at 2. "The total cumulative indebtedness of Maryland's 
pathological gamblers exceeds $4 billion." Id. 
2oGrinols, Bluff Or Winning Hand? Riverboat Gambling And Regional 
Employment And Unemployment, 51 ILL. Bus. REv., Spring 1994, at 8-11 
(indicating Illinois riverboats have not created a net increase in 
employment and may even nave cost net jobs). Since gambling activities 
take jobs from the,rest of the economy, the creation of jobs is an 
illusory claim. This principle is so basic that it is in the WORLD BooK-
ENCYCLOPEDIA. WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 398 (1994) ("The employment increases 
resulting from most gambling oper~tions are illusory."). See also Congo 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 71. 
2~This business/economic principle is another principle which is so 
basic that it is in the WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA. WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 
398-400 (1994). See supra note 20, and accompanying text; CED REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 49-50. 
22S ee , ~, CED REpORT, supra note 4, at 51; Congo Hearing, supra 
note 3, at 87-88 (statement of Congressman Frank R. Wolf). See also 
Congo Hearing, supra note 3, at 34 (statement of Congressman Richard H. 
Baker); FLA. DEP' T COM., IMPLICATIONS OF CASINO GAMBLING As AN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 5 (1994). 
23U. S. COMMISSION ON THE REV. OF THE NAT I L POL' Y TOWARD GAMBLING IN AMERICA 
(U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1976). 
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Because some demographics can easily allow the initial profit 
margins of many legalized gambling activities to beextremely'large, it 
should be anticipated that companies will invest millions of dollars to 
encourage the legalization of gambling activities in various states. In 
1994, for example, at least $16.5 million was spent in a losing campaign 
to bring casino gawbling to Florida, 24 and at least $15 million was 
spent during two years on campaigns (including $8 million in the 1994 
winning campaign) to bring video gambling terminals to 'Missouri. 25 
However, skeptical economists emphasize that "any" influx of money to a 
community will create the appearance of economic development, and the 
socio-economic costs should not be overlooked. 26 
Several studies by the gambling industry allegedly bolster the 
claims of economic benefits. To examine these claims the Ford 
Foundation and the Aspen Institute funded a-comprehensive 1994 report by 
the Center for Economic Development at the University of Massachusetts, 
which was entitled Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic 
Development (CED Report) .27 The CED Report analyzed fourteen industry 
studies, and in general, was highly critical of them. Emphasizing that 
no state had a comprehensive development plan which analyzed legalizing 
gambling activities, the CED Report concluded that "hiding the costs" 
was apparently widespread and that legalizing gambling activities acted 
as economic "cannibalism" on the pre-existing economy and on other 
businesses .. 28 
In the social-welfare context, legalized gambling is widely-
accepted as constituting a regressive tax on the poor.29 In other 
words, governmental policies directed toward "legalizing" and 
enccuracring gambling activit;es make poor people poorer and intensify 
24The public relations budget for convincing the voters to approve 
this referendum question on November 8, 1994, was apparently 
$16.5 million--significantly more than the combined budgets of the two 
gubernatorial 'candidates, Jeb Bush and Governor Lawton Chiles.' Louis 
Lavelle, Voters Deal Loss to Casinos: Gambling Backers Lose Despite 
$16.5 Million Campaicrn, TAMPA TRIBUNE,. Nov. 9, 1994, at 1, 5. 
25Terry Ganey & Mark Schlinkman..T'J., Hancock II Out: Slot Games In, 
ST. LOUIS 'PosT-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1994, at A6. 
26BETTER GOV'T Assoc., STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING 'IN CHICAGO 
(1992) (a comprehensive and well-documented report) (introductory 
statements by BGA President William Lear and Exec. Dir. Terrence 
Brunner) [hereinafter BETTER GOV'T Assoc. REPORT]. 
27 CED REpORT I supra note' 4. 
28 I d. at 16-19, 39, 51. See also Gold, supra note 16, at 30. 
29See, ~ CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE 
(Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research, Harvard Unlv. Press 1989). 
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~ nre-existing sacial-welfare prablems. These sacia-ecanamic 
~ negatives are calculated ta be extremely castly, and they parallel the 
,":' negatives associated with alcohol and drug addiction. Substantial ;~~~ 
7 
,~. changes and unpredictable cansequences can be anticipated thraughaut the 
insurance industry ·(Le., increas'ed fraud in the billians 'Of dalla,rs), 
,~i the banking industry (Le. r extended credit losses) and the general 
~;?' business cammunity, including r for example, increased personnel costs r 
,; .last wark productiv~tYrand bankruptcies. 30 
In the national mediar the cast/benefit debate invalving increased 
legalized gambling has been growing in scape. As this trend continues, 
a 1994 artic1e in the Columbia Jaurnalism Review cautions the news media 
<~.' . ";;~; ta "flat out ask [experts r academics, and even ather reparters] if they 
l make maney off the industry. ,,3·1 
~~~=, 
.-:~'f" 
Several prestigiaus u.S. business groups have instinctively 
':.," 
responded ta these concerns. Far example, in September 'Of l:993, the 
~r as-member Greater Washingtonr D.C. Baard 'Of Trade unanimausly rejected 
{: the Mayorrs prapasal ta bring casina-style gambling ta 
(, Washingtan, D. C. 32 
::f' 
.. -~~ ... The gravamen 'Of this debate is that state gavernments,by 
;it·· legalizing gambling activities, are creating large socia-economic 
:i:' prablems which did nat previausly exist. It is well-established that !rl 
.- "legalizing" gamblinqactivities (the "acceptability factar") and making 
.:-:~.. those activities available to the public (the "accessibility factor'tl, 
t-:_- state gavernments are creating a new papulatian 'Of addicted gamblers- -a 
recagnized addictive activity pursuant ta.the American Psychiatric 
Assaciatian (APA) , with parallels ta alcahal and drug addictians. Fram 
<i. a baseline 'Of .77 percent, the perceritage 'Of the adult papulation wha 
!" are campulsive gamblers can easily rise ta between 1.5 and 5 percent 
once gambling is legalized. The percentage 'Of teens wha became 
compulsive gamblers generally ranges between. 4 and 6 percent, but this 
range appears ta be increasing. 33 
" Campulsive garribling will prabably hover atappraximately 
.77 percent 'Of the papulation regardless of the steps taken by ethicists 
andgavernments ta eradicate 'Or salve. this prablem. Hawever, the 
interesting statistic is that once state gavernments legalize gambling--
once gambling receives the imprimatur 'Of gavernment andbecames nat 'Only 
"socialagically acceptable" but alsa is advertised as such--the number 
30Strategic Ecanomic Basel sunra nate 2, at sao·nn. 96-100. 
31Stephem F. simurda, When Gambling Cames To Tawn, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 36, 37-38. 
32L iz Spayd & Yalanda Woadlee, Trade Baard Rejects D.C. Casina 
~, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at Al. 
33Strategic Econamic Base, supra nate 2, at 581, nn. 103-07. 
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of compulsive gamblers will increase from .77 percent to between l.5 and 
5 percent of the population. 
The social, business, economic and governmental costs of this 
phenomenon are potentially catastrophic. The average socio-economic 
cost per compUlsive gambler per year has been calculated at $53,000. 34 
For example, by "legalizing" land-based casino gambling and VLT's, the 
business-economic evidence stronglr suggests that the South Dakota 
legislature has created, within 2 years, an additional $37l million per 
year in economic and social costs to its citizens. 35 Even if these 
negative numbers were to overstate the problems, they are still 
significant enough to predict major problems for U.S. society, business, 
and government. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the twentieth century, the U.S. economy has operated 
within a pristine economic environment Uncontaminated by widespread 
legalized gambling. However, because pro-gambling philosophies are 
spreading rapidly throughout the United States, and the governmental 
infatuation with legalized gambling is so pervasive, the impacts of 
legalized gambling will sooIi'be felt throughout the local, state and 
federal governmental systems--regardless of whether a particular state 
has or has not legalized a particular form of gambling. Academic 
disciplines will change and the standard economic formulae will have to 
be modified to,accommodate the economic impacts of the gambling, 
industry. Education will suffer both philosophically and fiscally as 
educational budgets are· redirected toward addressing the increasing 
social-welfare costs. 
The criminal justice system will incur not only increased costs, 
but also new forms of misconduct (such as gamblers unfairly beating the 
odds or "cheating" t~e legalized gambling operations). Financial 
institutions and batiks will experience rapid and perhaps destabilizing 
impacts as pre-existing assets and large proportions of fixed consumer 
assets are diverted into legalized gambling activities. Bad debts and 
increased insurance fraud are project~d to increase significantly. 
34See BETTER GoV'T Assoc. REPORT, supra note 26, at l4 (.$53, OOO/yr. is 
adjusted 
1994 the 
$53,000, 
$35,000. 
for inflation in 1992 dollars) (citing to POLITZER ET AL.) • 
range of cost estimates "began to fluctuate between $l3,200 
with most estimates beginning to group around $l3,200 to 
See Congo Hearing, supra note 3, at 80 n.l2. 
By 
and 
35For an analysis of this phenomenon, see, ~, John W. Kindt, The 
Economic Impacts Of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 D~ ·L. REV. 5l, 
73-75 (l994). In 1995 an apparent confirmation Of this phenomenon was 
reported in the case of legalized gambling activities in Iowa. Iowa 
Dep't Human Services, Gambling And Probl~m Gambling In Iowa: A 
Replication Survey (l995). 
.. ~.' :1 
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If the gambling trends of the 1990s continue, the negative impacts 
will prolong recessionarJ trends ~~d slow recoveries in local, state and 
national economies. The economic history of the United States has 
indicated that the u.s. public has intermittently flirted with gambling 
~~d repeatedly rejected it as economically and sociologically 
unworkable. 
If the U.S." public likes the "War on Crime" and.the "War on 
Drugs," then the public will be enthralled with the forthcoming "War on 
Gambling." The tragedy is that unlike the first two "wars" on social 
ills, the "War on Gambling" can still be avoided--simply by not 
legali·zing gambling activities. In other words, it will take 
affirmative government action to magnify a minor social ill into a major 
socio-economic problem. 
Regardless of these considerations, it appears to be widely-
accepted that u.s. economic strength constitutes a sine qua non of 
worldwide economic stability. Any industry which has a growth rate a~ 
substantial as that of the legalized gambling industry and which has the 
potential to cannibalize the pre-existing economy with a potential. 
negative mUltiplier effect needs to be closely examined. At a minimum, 
a national commission to investigate the economic claims of the industry 
is necessary. In the interim, prudent strategic national policy 
necessitates that ·the federal government. prohibit any increases in the 
various forms of legalized gambling activities or increases in its 
geographical expansion. 
